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ARTICLE 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE TAXATION OF COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE 
ROBERT W. MCGEE· 
INTRODUCTION 
Computer software has tax consequences both at the state 
and federal levels. At the state level, software might be subject 
to sales, use or property taxation if it is considered to be tangi-
ble personal property. On the federal level, software may qualify 
for the investment tax credit or research credit, also depending 
on tangibility. In the last few years, both state and federal 
courts and legislatures have rendered decisions and passed laws 
that have altered the taxability of computer software. This arti-
cle summarizes those changes and attempts to spot a trend. 
STATE TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
For more than a decade after the first software tax case was 
decided, computer software was uniformly classified as intangi-
ble for sales, use and personal property tax purposes, and there-
fore exempt from taxation.1 Then, in 1983, the decisions began 
• MST, DePaul University; J.D., Cleveland State University; PhD., University of 
Warwick, PhD., Union Graduate School; C.P.A. (Ohio & New Jersey); Associate Profes· 
sor, Seton Hall University. 
1. The first case to directly address the software tangibility issue was District of 
Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Other early cases 
also held software to be intangible for sales, use or property tax purposes. See State v. 
Central Computer Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); County of Sacramento v. As-
sessment Appeals Bd. No.2, 32 Cal. App. 3d 654, lOS Cal. Rptr. 434 (1973); First Nat'l. 
Bank of Springfield v. Dep't. of Revenue, 85 III. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Grey-
265 
1
McGee: Recent Developments in the Taxation of Computer Software
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
266 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:265 
to go in the other direction, classifying software as tangible and 
therefore subject to taxation.2 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.,s the 
issue was whether the purchase of a "canned" or off-the-shelf 
program on magnetic tape constituted a transaction upon which 
sales tax could be assessed. Equitable entered into several li-
cense agreements whereby it obtained the nontransferable and 
nonexclusive right to use several programs in perpetuity." Legal 
title, however, remained with the licensor. II 
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions involved 
"tangible personal property, namely, magnetic tapes which had 
been enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded 
thereon," and were subject to sales tax.6 Equitable argued that 
"the predominant purpose or essence of the transaction governs 
classification of the sale as involving either tangible or intangible 
property. In the transfer of computer programs via magnetic 
tape, the purpose is to obtain the program, an intangible, and 
not the tangible tape."7 The Data Processing Management Asso-
hound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 
52 (1974); James v. TRES Computer Service, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982); Com-
merce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'!. Bank of Fort 
Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
A number of cases involving data processing service bureaus also address the issue of 
computer software tangibility. See, e.g., Miami Citizens Nat'I. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lind-
ley, 50 Ohio St. 2d 249, 364 N.E.2d 25 (1977); Citizens Fin. Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St. 
2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975); Accountants Computer Serv., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 
2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 
(Tex. 1977). 
2. For early cases holding software to be tangible, see Comptroller of the Treasury v. 
Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983); Citizens & S. Sys., Inc. v. South 
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v. 
King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). Software is sometimes considered tangible for 
Uniform Commercial Code purposes. See Chatios Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register 
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); RRX Indus. Inc. v. Lab-Con Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 138 Misc. 2d 
80, 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1988); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under The uce, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979). 
3. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983) 
4. [d. at 461, 464 A.2d at 248. 
5. [d. at 400, 464 A.2d at 249. 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 466, 464 A.2d at 251-52. Equitable's principal argument was that the Court 
should sever the program from the tangible tape. Thus, the transaction should be viewed 
from two levels, the delivery of a tangible tape and the delivery of intangible informa-
tion. [d. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253. Courts that use the "essence of the transaction" test 
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ciation, in its amicus brief, contended that "the transaction is a 
license to use the program, and that such a license is a form of 
intangible property."s 
The court held that Equitable acquired "tangible personal 
property, namely, magnetic tapes which had been enhanced in 
value by the copies of the program coded thereon,"9 and that 
"the licenses. . .do not grant intangible rights from the proprie-
tors to Equitable ... [but] simply erect contractual limitations 
on the use which Equitable might otherwise make of the statuto-
rily unprotected program copies it acquired."lo The court in Eq-
uitable thus rejected the reasoning of a long line of cases that 
held taped copies to be intangible. The court saw misconcep-
tions in the technological underpinnings of these decisions and 
departures in reasoning from that usually applied in sales tax 
cases. Furthermore, the court noted that a tape containing a 
copy of a canned program does not lose its tangible character 
because its content is a reproduction of the product of intellec-
tual effort, just as a phonograph record does not become intangi-· 
ble because it is a reproduction of artistic effort.ll The price 
paid for a copy of a canned program reflects the cost of develop-
ing the program as well as any profit that the proprietor hopes 
to recover. In the court's view, the fact that a canned software 
program on tape is much more expensive than the typical pho-
nograph record does not render the program tape any less tangi-
ble than a phonograph record. 12 
The court did not find any legally significant distinction for 
sales tax purposes between the canned computer program on 
magnetic tape and music on a phonograph record: 
'Both recorded music and computer programs are 
sets of information in a form which, when passed 
over a magnetic head, cause minute currents to 
look at the substance of the transaction rather than the form it took. For example, if the 
value of a program is $50,000 and the value of the tape or disk upon which the program 
is stored has a separate value of $50, then the essence of the transaction is the purchase 
of a program, not the purchase of a tape or disk. The fact that a tape or disk is also 
acquired in the transaction is merely incidental. 
8. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 251. 
9. Id. at 460, 464 A.2d at 249. 
10. Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 252-53. 
11. Id. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261. 
12. Id. 
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flow in such a way that desired physical work is 
accomplished.' In the case of the phonograph rec-
ord, the sales tax statute in Maryland has never 
been viewed as conceptually severing the copy of 
the performance from the tangible carrier .13 
The court concluded that "the statute does not sever copies of 
computer programs from the tangible carriers employed in the 
subject sales."H 
The day after Equitable was decided in Maryland, in what 
appeared to be a one-two punch to the tax-free nature of com-
puter software, the Vermont Supreme Court decided Chittenden 
Trust Company v. King.11I This case also held software to be tax-
able, but this time it was a compensating use tax that was levied 
against canned software. Ie In holding that the computer tape 
was tangible personal property, the court noted that "the tape 
[could] be seen, weighed, measured and touched and [was] not a 
right or credit."17 The court rejected Chittenden's contention 
that the "focus of the transaction" was the transfer of intangible 
knowledge and information, noting that the purchase of an off"-
the-shelf program does not involve the sale of personal services, 
but rather the sale of tangible personal property. IS 
The court also rejected the argument that a computer pro-
gram tape was distinguishable from other taxable personal prop-
erty such as films, videotapes, books, cassettes and records. In 
comparison to each of the latter items, the court found that 
computer software was similar since the "value lies in their re-
spective abilities to store and later display or transmit their 
contents. "19 
13. [d. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261 (citation omitted). 
14. [d. 
15. 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
16. [d. A use tax is generally imposed on the sale or lease of property that is not 
subject to the sales tax. 
17. [d. at 273, 465 A.2d at 1101. The Vermont statute defines tangible personal 
property as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured. felt. touched or 
in any other manner perceived by the senses and shall include fuel and electricity but 
shall not include rights and credits. insurance policies. bills of exchange. stocks and 
bonds and similar evidences of indebtedness or ownership." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 
9701(7) (1981). 
18. Chittenden, 143 Vt. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1101-02. 
19. [d. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1102. 
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In conclusion, the court stated: 
It may well be that the Bank could have pro-
cured, by way of telephone or personal service, 
the same programming information so as to avoid 
a use tax. To base the tax consequences of a 
transaction on how it could have been structured 
"would require rejection of the established tax 
principle that a transaction is to be given its tax 
effect in accord with what actually occurred and 
not in accord with what might have occurred." 
This we will not do. The Bank must accept the 
consequences of its choice to purchase the pro-
gram in the form of a tape.20 
269 
The following year, in Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court also held canned software to be subject to the sales and 
use tax.21 Here, the court compared the sale of magnetic tapes to 
a sale of books or phonograph records, observing that the con-
veyance of knowledge by a professor to students in a classroom 
would not be subject to tax, but publication in the form of a 
book or phonograph record would be taxable22 In assessing the 
tax, the value of the books or records is based upon the value of 
what is contained in them, which is intangible.23 The value of 
the paper, binding, ink or other material cost is not relevant.2• 
Appellants relied on the long line of cases that distinguished 
software from books, records and movies because of the separa-
bility of the computer program from the magnetic tape and the 
inherent inseparability of the matter contained in a book, on a 
record, or in a movie from a book.25 The Court was not con-
vinced and instead agreed with the idea that: 
[T]he taxability of a sale of a canned program 
copy should not turn on whether the buyer stores 
the program in memory. A tax system cannot be 
20. [d. at 274-75, 465 A.2d at 1102 (citation omitted). 
21. 280 S.C. 138. 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984). 
22. [d. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. (citing First Nat'l. Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d 
84,421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); see Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 
1976)). 
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administered dependent upon whether or not, at 
the time of the transaction, the buyer's intent is 
to store the program continuously in memory.26 
Citizens asserted that the instructions could have been in-
troduced into the computer through intangible means such as by 
telephone or personal programming, and that the fact that 
transmission was by magnetic tape should not make the transac-
tion taxable.27 On this point, the court indicated that Citizens 
had to accept the consequences of its choice to purchase the 
computer program in the form of a magnetic tape, finding that 
"[t]o base the tax consequences of a transaction on how it could 
have been structured would require rejection of the established 
tax principle that a transaction be given its tax effect in accord 
with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might 
have occurred."28 
Another case that held software to be tangible is Hasbro In-
dustries, Inc. v. Norberg.29 In that case, Hasbro purchased a 
"canned" software program that could be put to immediate use 
without alteration or customization.30 Hasbro argued that the 
software was not subject to the use tax because it constituted 
"(1) a nontaxable service, the transfer of the disk and punch 
cards bearing the written instructions being merely incidental to 
those services, and (2) intangible personal property."31 The 
court found that contention to be without merit.32 Being a 
"canned" program that could be used by any number of pur-
chasers, the service element of the software was virtually nonex-
istent. 33 Although the software program was not perceptible to 
the senses, the disk and punch cards could be seen, weighed and 
measured, making the program tangible for use tax purposes.3• 
Thus, the Rhode Island court adopted the position of the Equi-
26. Citizens & Southern, 280 S.C. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Comptroller of 
the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248, 255 (1983». 
27. [d. at 141-42, 464 A.2d at 718-19. 
28. [d. at 143, 464 A.2d at 719 (quoting Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 405 A.2d 
1100, 1102 (Vt. 1983)). 
29. 487 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985). 
30. [d. at 126. 
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table and Chittenden courts. 811 Rhode Island joined a growing 
minority view that had gained much support in the previous 18 
months as a result of the Vermont and Maryland decisions. 
In 1986, the Tennessee Supreme Court went a step further 
than other courts and taxed custom software, which, until that 
time, had usually been considered exempt from sales and use tax 
because it was the sale of a service rather than a product. In 
Creasy Systems Consultants, Inc. v. Olsen,88 a consulting com-
pany designed or modified a client's software on a contract basis, 
using the client's own disk or tape rather than its own. The con-
sulting company argued that there was no transfer of tangible 
personal property because the software was input directly into 
client-owned disks or tapes, and not by means of transferring 
the program from the consulting company's disk or tape.87 Pay-
ment was on a contract basis, usually by the hour, which distin-
guished it from the usual software sale, which was by the pack-
age rather than time-based. 88 
The Tennessee statute at issue in Creasy defined sale to in-
clude the transfer of customized or packaged computer 
software.89 The court rejected the argument that the sale could 
avoid tax by inputting the information directly into client-
owned disks or tapes rather than by inputting the information 
into consulting company-owned materials, then transferring 
them to the client.40 The court held that the law imposed a tax 
on the transfer or design of customized or packaged computer 
software regardless of how the transfer was accomplished.41 This 
view differs somewhat from that of other courts, which hold that 
the actual means of transfer is determinative, not the means of 
transfer that could have been adopted.42 
35. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 
248 (1983); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
36. Creasy Sys. Consultants, Inc. v. Olsen, 716 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1986). 
37. [d. at 36. 
38. [d. at 37. 
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(14)(8). 
40. Creasy, 716 S.W.2d at 36. 
41. [d. 
42. See University Computing Company v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1984) 
(holding that software developed for internal use was exempt from taxation, but software 
developed for sale was taxable). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-6-101 et seq., 67-6-
102(14)(8), 67-6-210. For an example of a case that held the actual means of transmis-
sion to be determinative, see Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 275, 465 A.2d 
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The West Virginia Supreme Court recently agreed with the 
Citizens & Southern Systems, and Equitable decisions, both of 
which reject the "essence of the transaction" test.43 
Other courts have made a distinction between canned and 
custom software. In Measurex Systems, Inc. v. State Tax As-
sessor, the Maine Supreme Court held that canned software is 
taxable but custom software is not.44 It based its decision on the 
"relative value test," which it had previously relied upon in 
Community Telecasting Service v. Johnson.411 In discussing the 
differences between canned and custom software the court noted 
as an important factor the value that the product has to non-
buyers. 
[W]here the creation of property to be transferred 
requires high skill and the materials involved are 
of relatively little value and the principal value of 
the finished product lies in the services to be ren-
dered, and the product is of little value to anyone 
other than the buyer, the transaction may be 
deemed a sale of services rather than goods. The 
relative dollar value of the service as against that 
of the product, sometimes expressed in percent-
ages, has been held significant. "Canned" 
software has value apart from the programming 
services that create it because of its potential for 
resale and its value to more than one buyer. 
"Custom" software, on the other hand, falls 
within the definition of services set forth in Com-
munity Telecasting. The creation of "custom" 
software requires high skill, although the materi-
als (computer disks) are of little value. Moreover, 
the product is of little value to other buyers be-
cause the software is prepared specifically for the 
1100, 1102 (Vt. 1983), and infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
43. Pennsylvania and West Virginia Supply Corp. v. Rose, 368 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 
1988). In this case, the previous statute classified off-the-shelf computer software as tan-
gible and subject to the use tax even though information was the real product. Id. at 104-
05. The rationale of the statute was that the disks upon which the information was 
stored had physical form and were capable of being touched, seen and possessed-the 
classic definition of tangible property. Id. at 104. See W. VA. CODE §§ 11-15A-2, 11-15A-
2(a), 11-15A-1(5) (1969 and 1983 Replacement Vol.). 
44. Measurex Sys., Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 490 A.2d 1192 (Me. 1985). 
45. Id. at 1195-96. See also Community' Telecasting Servo V. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 
(Me. 1966). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss2/1
1989] TAX LAW 
needs of the particular user. The principal value 
lies in the services of the programmer.f8 
273 
However, the trend in case law since 1983 has not been uni-
formly in favor of taxing software as tangible personal property. 
In Ohio, an appellate court in Compuserve v. Lindley, found 
software to be intangible, and not subject to sales, use or prop-
erty taxation.47 Although the software was stored on tangible 
tapes, and, as operational software, was indispensable to the op-
eration of the computer, the true purpose of the software 
purchase was to obtain intangible information, and the purchase 
of the tapes was merely incidental to the purchase of intangible 
information.48 In effect, the court held that Ohio was attempting 
to tax personal service transactions, which were exempt from 
taxation because of their intangible nature.49 It also specifically 
disagreed with the holdings in Chittenden, Equitable, Citizens 
and Southern Systems and Hasbro because these cases held 
that the real purpose of the transaction was to obtain the me-
dium upon which the software was stored (tape, etc.) rather 
than the information itself. &0 
Courts in Michigan and California also have recently held 
software to be intangible and not subject to taxation.1I1 In Mac-
cabees,1I2 the Michigan Appellate Court, relying on decisions in 
the District of Columbia and Tennessee, held custom software to 
46. Measurex, 490 A.2d at 1195-96 (citations omitted). 
47. 41 Ohio App. 3d 260, 535 N.E.2d 360 (1987); but see Ohio Farmers Insurance 
Co. v. Lindley, No. 79-B-43 (Ohio Board of Tax Appeals July 15, 1981) (court found the 
purchase of software to be taxable on the grounds that the tangible tapes were the true 
object of the transaction); Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Lindley, 3 Ohio St. 3d 23, 445 
N.E.2d 1104 (1983) (where the true object of the transaction was a computer printout 
rather than a software program, the sale was held to be the sale of tangible personal 
property, and therefore subject to the sales tax). 
For other Ohio cases, see Interactive Information Sys., Inc. v. Limbach, 18 Ohio St. 
3d 309, 480 N.E.2d 1124 (1985); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 12 Ohio St. 3d 
80, 465 N.E.2d 440 (1984); Aedes Associates v. Lindley, No. C-830969, (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986). 
48. Compuserve, 41 Ohio App. 3d at 265-66, 535 N.E.2d at 365. 
49. [d. at 269-70, 535 N.E.2d at 369. 
50. [d. at 265, 535 N.E.2d at 365. 
51. General Business Sys. v. State Board of Equalization, 162 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56-57, 
208 Cal. Rptr. 374, 378 (1984), hearing den.; Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State 
Dep't of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561 (1983). 
52. Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't. of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 660, 
332 N.W.2d 561 (1983). 
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be intangible because it more closely resembled a service than a 
product.1!3 The court also noted that custom programs should be 
distinguished from canned programs.l!4 
In General Business Systems, a California appellate court 
held custom application software to be exempt from tax, since 
the true object of the transaction was rendition of services.1i1i Al-
though the software was delivered in the form of punch cards, 
delivery could have been by any number of other methods, in-
cluding transmittal through the computer's keyboard, over tele-
phone lines or via terminal. Delivery by cards was chosen be-
cause of convenience and cost.1i6 
Another distinction being made in types of computer 
software focuses on whether the program is application or opera-
tional software. The Kansas Supreme Court has determined that 
application software is intangible and operational software is 
tangible.1i7 This distinction in treatment is based on the differing 
natures of the two types of software. Operational software is 
needed to make the hardware work, and so has some attributes 
of hardware, which is tangible. Application software, on the 
other hand, is not needed to make the hardware work. 
While the majority of states still classify software as intan-
gible and thus non-taxable, some courts, employing different 
standards and tests, are finding software to be tangible. liS As a 
53. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615 
(1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). 
54. Maccabees, 122 Mich. App. at 664, 332 N.W.2d at 564 (citing Universal Com-
puter Assoc., 465 F.2d at 615.) 
55. General Business Sys., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 56-57, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (1984), 
hearing den.; see CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 6006(0, 6010.9, 601O.9(a), 6016, 6051. 
56. General Business Sys., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 53, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 375. 
57. In re Protest of Strayer, 239 Kan. 136, 716 P.2d 588 (1986); Appeal of AT&T 
Technologies, Inc., 242 Kan. 554, 749 P.2d 1033 (1988). 
58. The issue of computer software tangibility is relevant in other areas of the law 
besides tax. See Hancock v. State of Texas, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). In 
Hancock, an employee was accused of stealing several computer programs from his em-
ployer. [d. at 907-08. The employee maintained that he had committed petty theft rather 
than grand larceny because the only tangible property he stole was the paper on which 
the programs were printed and these tapes had a value of less than fifty dollars. [d. at 
908. The court disagreed, holding that the programs had a value in excess of the value of 
the paper upon which they were printed and that the programs, as well as the paper they 
were printed on, were tangible personal property for purposes of the criminal statute. [d. 
at 911. 
10
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result a software is classified as tangible and taxable in one state 
and intangible and tax exempt in another state. It does not ap-
pear that a uniform classification of software will emerge. The 
inconsistent treatment of software is not limited to the states 
but exists on the federal level as well. 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
Whether computer software is classified as tangible or in-
tangible determines whether it qualifies for federal tax credits. 
The Internal Revenue Code and regulations do not specifically 
state whether computer software is eligible for the investment 
tax credit ("ITC").Ci9 The Code merely states that tangible per-
sonal property qualifies for the investment tax credit, without 
mentioning whether computer software is tangible or intangi-
ble.60 The only guidance is found in a few IRS pronouncements 
and court cases. Although the investment tax credit was re-
pealed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act,61 the old rules still apply to 
many cases still pending before the various courts. Furthermore, 
the investment tax credit rules have been repealed or changed 
many times before, and are subject to possible re-enactment. 
Therefore, it is useful to examine the treatment of software as it 
relates to the investment tax credit. 
The Internal Revenue Service developed a two-prong test to 
determine whether or not an investment in computer software 
qualifies for the ITC.62 If the software exists independently of 
the hardware, it is treated as intangible property and therefore 
ineligible for the ITC.63 But if the software costs are included in 
59. I.R.C. §§ 38, 43 (1982). The investment tax credit reduces the tax liability, dollar 
for dollar, for purchases of certain tangible, depreciable property. Id. at § 38. For exam-
ple, if a business taxpayer purchases Section 38 property costing $100,000 and the in-
vestment tax credit percentage is 10%, then the tax liability is reduced by $10,000-10% 
of $100,000. Tax credits are better than deductions because of this dollar for dollar off-
set. If the income tax rate is 40%, each dollar deducted reduces the tax liability by only 
40 cents, whereas each dollar of tax credit reduces the tax liability by one dollar. Fur-
thermore, depreciation deductions can also be taken, so taxpayers can both deduct the 
cost of the asset over a number of years and claim an investment tax credit for the same 
asset. 
60.Id. 
61. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 49 (1986) ("Tax Reform Act of 
1986"). 
62. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303. 
63.Id. 
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the price of hardware and are not separately stated, an invest-
ment credit may be taken for the entire system, not just the por-
tion attributable to hardware.84 In other words, if the software is 
"bundled" with the hardware, it Qualifies for the investment tax 
credit. Otherwise, it does not. 
Federal courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of 
the tangibility of computer software. In Texas Instruments, Inc. 
v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held software to be tangible 
for investment tax credit and depreciation purposes.81i The court 
stated that it could not accurately separate the value of the in-
formation recorded on the tapes from the value of the tapes be-
cause the value of the data was wholly dependent upon the exis-
tence of the tapes.88 If the tapes were destroyed, nothing would 
remain. An investment in the data would have no value apart 
from an investment in the tapes. Thus, the software was tangi-
ble and eligible for the tax credit.87 
In Ronnen v. Commissioner,88 the Tax Court came to the 
opposite conclusion, holding that software is intangible and inel-
igible for the investment tax credit. In Ronnen, the court ap-
plied the intrinsic value test of Texas Instruments and con-
cluded that, based on different facts, the intrinsic value of the 
software was attributable to its intangible rather than tangible 
embodiments, and was therefore not eligible for the investment 
tax credit.89 
A federal District Court has also distinguished Texas In-
struments in holding software to be intangible, and therefore 
not eligible for the investment tax credit. In Bank of Vermont v. 
United States,70 the court found that the computer tape and the 
information contained in the tape could be separated and exist 
apart from each other. This was not the case in Texas 
Instruments. 
The inconsistency resulting from different state and federal 
64. Rev. Rul. 71·177, 1971·1 C.B. 5. 
65. 551 F.2d 599, 611 (5th Cir. 1977). 
66. [d. 
67. [d. 
68. 90 T.C. No.7, Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 2639 (1988). 
69. Id. at 2650. 
70. 61 A.F.T.R.2d (P·H) 88·788 (1988). 
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treatment of software tangibility was manifest in this case. The 
Vermont Supreme Court in Chittenden,71 had held computer 
software to be tangible and subject to the use tax. The District 
Court in Bank of Vermont, however, rejected Chittenden as not 
binding on the federal courts. This put the Bank in the unenvi-
able position of having the same software treated as tangible for 
state use tax purposes and intangible for federal investment 
credit purposes. 
In another context, the Tax Court has held that software is 
intangible for collapsible corporation purposes.72 A collapsible 
corporation is formed to convert ordinary income into capital 
gains to effectuate tax savings.73 The Internal Revenue Code 
prohibits the prearranged use of a corporation for these pur-
poses.74 In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner,7C1 Com-
putax, a wholly owned subsidiary of Computer Sciences Corpo-
ration, developed a software program for the computer 
preparation of income tax returns. The corporation took the po-
sition that its software program for the preparation of tax re-
turns was intangible property and that the term "property" as 
used in IRC section 341 only applied to tangible property.76 The 
Tax Court held that the computer software programs were in-
tangible property developed by the corporation and that intangi-
ble property should be considered property within the meaning 
of section 341.77 
71. Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
72. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 (1974). 
73. A collapsible corporation is defined as 
A corporation formed or availed of principally for the manu-
facture, construction, or production of property ... with a view 
to the sale or exchange of [corporate] stock by its sharehold-
ers ... before the realization by the corporation of a substan-
tial part of the taxable income to be derived from such prop-
erty, and the realization by such shareholder of gain 
attributable to such property. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (5th ed. 1979). 
74. See I.R.C. § 341(b)(l) (1982). If the IRS classifies the corporation as collapsible, 
the gain that otherwise would be capital is taxed as ordinary gain, which means more 
taxes are paid. Collapsible corporations are used to reduce the tax bite. IRS realizes this 
fact, so it treats capital transactions of such corporations as if they were ordinary 
transactions. 
75. 63 T.C. 327. 
76. [d. at 346. 
77. [d. at 346-47. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appears that the weight of authority, while no longer 
unanimous, still classifies computer software as intangible and 
non-taxable. There appears, however, to be a trend among the 
states to characterize computer software as tangible for state 
sales, use and property tax purposes. State courts are distin-
guishing types of software and the means by which the software 
is delivered. "Canned" software is more likely to be classified as 
tangible than is custom software, although at least one court has 
classified custom software as tangible. Also, if the software is de-
livered in the form of disk or tape, some courts may be more 
likely to find that the software is tangible as compared to 
software transmitted via telephone lines. 
Although federal courts generally hold that software is in-
tangible and not eligible for the investment tax credit, at least 
one court held software to be tangible property that qualified for 
the investment tax credit. In states that are classifying software 
as tangible, there is the potential for inconsistent state and fed-
eral treatment of software. 
With the rapid development in computer technology and 
changing nature of computer software, however, it appears that 
courts will continue to confront the issue of whether software is 
tangible or intangible with differing results. Inconsistent treat-
ment of software among the states and federal jurisdictions un-
doubtedly will continue. 
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